The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring

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The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring

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Johannes Horner
Wojciech Olszewski

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Wojciech Olszewski

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Paper provided by www.najecon.org in its series NajEcon Working Paper Reviews with number 172782000000000006.

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Date of creation: 25 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:172782000000000006

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Article
- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-04-03 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2005-04-03 (Game Theory)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
- Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September. [Downloadable!]
Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16. [Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Chicken in Prison: Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Folk Theorem with Communication," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori, 2006. "Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]

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