• NEP-ALL-2004-09-05 (All new papers)

1. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1451, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000170, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & G. J. Mailath & S. Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers 576, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1571, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Working Papers 604, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
   • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
4. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • RICHARD McLEAN & ANDREW POSTLEWAITE, 2004. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71, pages 809-827, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
6. Bhaskar, V, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 135-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Papers 9485, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
7. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
8. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000367, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    Other versions:
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
13. Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
14. Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 172782000000000006, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    • V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
17. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
19. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Piccione, Michele, 2002. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 70-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
2. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-36, March. [Downloadable!]
3. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
5. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Folk Theorem with Communication," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]