This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Eichengreen, Barry
von Hagen, Jürgen

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Avocates of formal fiscal restraints on the member states of the European Monetary Union often argue that US experience proves that a monetary union needs such constraints to guarantee the stability of the common currency. We show, first, that the origin of formal fiscal restraints on US state governments is unrelated to monetary questions. Second, we show that the same is true for similar constraints in Australia. Third, we show that the incidence of fiscal restraints is strongly correlated with the central government's ownership of the national tax base. The implication for Europe is that fiscal restraints are unnecessary as long as the EU retains a high degree of fiscal decentralization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1247.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1247.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1247

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism; Fiscal Restraints; Monetary Union;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management
H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 2000. "EMU and Enlargement," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 481, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 May 2001. [Downloadable!]
  2. Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 1998. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," International Trade 9804001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Adriana Arreaza & Bent E. Sorensen & Oved Yosha, 1998. "Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries," NBER Working Papers 6372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. István Benczes, 2001. "Stability Pact for Hungary? Rise of Third Generation Reforms," CERT Discussion Papers 0103, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Mark Hallerberg & Rolf Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen, 2006. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Discussion Papers 150, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jürgen von Hagen, 2002. "Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(3), pages 263-284. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ullrich, Katrin, 2006. "Market discipline and the use of government bonds as collateral in the EMU," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-46, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Richard Bird, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia: A Canadian Perspective," International Tax Program Papers 0409, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, revised Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
  9. Thomas D. Willett, . "A Political Economy Analysis of the Maastricht and Stability Pact Fiscal Criteria," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-33, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  10. Fidrmuc, J. & Horvath, J., 1998. "Stability of monetary unions : lessons from the break-up of Czechoslovakia," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jürgen Von Hagen & Massimo Bordignon & Bhajan S. Grewal & Per Peterson & Helmut Seitz & Matz Dahlberg, 2000. "Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies," RES Working Papers 3100, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  12. Philipp Paulus, 2004. "The fiscal stability impact of monetary unions - looking beneath the Stability Pact debate," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 05/2004, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jürgen von Hagen, 2005. "Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions," Discussion Papers 149, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Easterly, William, 1999. "When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2109, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Kenneth M. Kletzer, . "Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency:," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-22, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Norbert Berthold & Rainer Fehn & Eric Thode, 1999. "Real wage rigidities, accommodative demand policies, and the functioning of EMU," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 135(4), pages 545-572, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bernd Hayo, 2005. "Perspektiven einer Asiatischen Währungsunion," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200508, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.