Information about:
Mark Hallerberg

Other registered authors

Email:
Homepage: http://www.hertie-school.org/content.php?nav_id=463
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

• Hertie School of Governance

  Location: Berlin, Germany
  Homepage: http://www.hertie-school.org
  Email:
  Phone: +49/30/259 219 0
  Fax: +49/30/259 219 111
  Postal: Quartier 110, Friedrichstraße 180, 10117 Berlin
  Handle: RePEc:edi:hertide (registered authors at this institution)

Working papers

1. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]

2. Mark Hallerberg & Rolf Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen, 2006. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Discussion Papers 150, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Mark Hallerberg & Rolf Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Working Paper Series 419, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
   
   Published as:
   • Hallerberg, Mark & Strauch, Rolf & von Hagen, Jurgen, 2007. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 338-359, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

3. Rolf Strauch & Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "Budgetary Forecasts in Europe – The Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/42, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Rolf Strauch & Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "Budgetary forecasts in Europe - the track record of stability and convergence programmes," Working Paper Series 307, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]

4. Mark Hallerberg & Lúcio Vinhas de Souza, 2000. "The Political Business Cycles of EU Accession Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-085/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]

5. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

6. Mark Hallerberg & Jurgen von Hagen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Published as:
   • Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]

7. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: A Reconsideration," CEPR Discussion Papers 1589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

8. Hallerberg, Mark & Basinger, Scott, 1996. "Why Did All but Two OECD Countries Initiate Tax Reform from 1986 to 1990?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.

1. Mark Hallerberg & Guntram Wolff, 2008. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 379-396, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. Hallerberg, Mark & Strauch, Rolf & von Hagen, Jurgen, 2007. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 338-359, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Mark Hallerberg & Rolf Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Working Paper Series 419, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • Mark Hallerberg & Rolf Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen, 2006. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Discussion Papers 150, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

3. Mark Hallerberg, 2002. "Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 56(4), pages 775-802, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Published as:
   • Hallerberg, Mark, 2002. "Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 775-802, November. [Downloadable!]

4. Mark Hallerberg & Rolf Strauch, 2002. "On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe," Empirica, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 183-207, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Mark Hallerberg & Jurgen von Hagen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (2) 2000-11-13 2006-07-15 Author is listed
2. NEP-EEC: European Economics (4) 2005-10-04 2005-10-04 2006-07-15 2006-11-18 Author is listed
3. NEP-FOR: Forecasting (1) 2005-10-04
4. NEP-IFN: International Finance (1) 2004-05-09
5. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (2) 2005-10-04 2006-11-18 Author is listed
6. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (5) 2004-05-09 2005-10-04 2005-10-04 2006-07-15 2006-11-18 Author is listed

This page was last updated on 2009-12-28.