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Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions

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  • Hallerberg, Mark

Abstract

It is indisputable that the government s economic institutions areimportant. Scholars have focused considerable attention on theimplications of exchange-rate regimes, the relative independence ofcentral banks, open versus closed capital markets, and the in uence ofthe structure of labor markets on economic policy and economicperformance. An innovative body of literature in the last decade hasmoved beyond a consideration of the effects of economic institutions toconsider why governments choose some institutional forms over others.That literature usually discusses the choices in isolation. Thecontributors to this volume present a second generation of scholarshipthat addresses the interaction of these institutional choices and, inparticular, the joint choice of a level of central bank independence(CBI) and the exchange-rate regime.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 04 (September)
Pages: 775-802

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Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:04:p:775-802_44

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Cited by:
  1. Beth Simmons & Jens Hainmueller, 2005. "Can Domestic Institutions Explain Exchange Rate Regime Choice? The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions Reconsidered," International Finance 0505011, EconWPA.
  2. Hossain, Monzur, 2009. "Institutional development and the choice of exchange rate regime: A cross-country analysis," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 56-70, March.
  3. Thomas Plümper & Eric Neumayer, 2008. "Exchange rate regime choice with multiple key currencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25164, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Yannick Lucotte, 2010. "The choice of adopting inflation targeting in emerging economies: Do domestic institutions matter?," Post-Print hal-00539713, HAL.
  5. Hyoung-kyu Chey, 2013. "The Concepts, Consequences, and Determinants of Currency Internationalization," GRIPS Discussion Papers 13-03, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  6. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," Research Department Publications 4593, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  7. Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, 2008. "Exchange Rate Regime Choice with Multiple Key Currencies," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp264, IIIS.
  8. Richard C.K. Burdekin & King Banaian & Mark Hallerberg & Pierre L. Siklos, 2011. "Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 3(4), pages 340-354, November.
  9. Niamh Hardiman & Patrick Murphy & Orlaith Burke, 2008. "Legitimating Fiscal Stabilization: Ireland in Comparative Perspective," Working Papers 200813, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
  10. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2010. "When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 766-781, September.
  11. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto H. Stein, 2008. "Un Enfoque Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?," Research Department Publications 4594, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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