Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence from State and Local Governments in the First Half of the 20th Century

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gilligan, Thomas W.
  • Matsusaka, John G.
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper tests whether state and local fiscal policy depended on the number of seats in the legislature in the first half of the 20th century. We find that large legislatures spent more, as implied by the "Law of 1/n" from the fiscal commons/logrolling literature. The same relation appears in the latter half of the century, and therefore seems to be systematic. We also find--again consistent with postwar evidence--that only the size of the upper house was important. We are unable to find robust evidence that expenditure depended on the partisan makeup of the legislature.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/54/1/ntj-v54n01p57-82-fiscal-policy-legislature-size.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/54/1/ntj-v54n01p57-82-fiscal-policy-legislature-size.html
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by National Tax Association in its journal National Tax Journal.

    Volume (Year): 54 (2001)
    Issue (Month): n. 1 (March)
    Pages: 57-82

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:54:y:2001:i:n._1:p:57-82

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 725 15th St. NW #600. Washington, D.C. 20005-2109
    Phone: (202)737-3325
    Fax: (202) 737-7308
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.ntanet.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    2. Crain, W Mark & Muris, Timothy J, 1995. "Legislative Organization of Fiscal Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 311-33, October.
    3. Gilligan, Thomas W & Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Deviations from Constituent Interests: The Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 383-401, July.
    4. Bradbury, John Charles & Crain, W. Mark, 2001. "Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 309-325, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "Political stability and fiscal policy: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 505-534, September.
    2. Pettersson-Lidbom, Per, 2012. "Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 269-278.
    3. Jordahl, Henrik & Liang, Che-Yuan, 2006. "Merged Municipalities, Higher Debt: On Free-riding and the Common Pool Problem in Politics," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics 2006:27, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    4. Katsuyoshi Nakazawa, 2013. "Municipality amalgamation and free-ride behavior: Eligibility assessments for long-term care insurance in Japan," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 201340, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Tyrefors Hinnerich, Björn, 2009. "Do merging local governments free ride on their counterparts when facing boundary reform?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 721-728, June.
    6. de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
    7. Katsuyoshi Nakazawa, 2013. "Amalgamation, free-ride behavior, and regulation," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 201339, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    8. Marcela Eslava & Oskar Nupia, 2010. "Political Fragmentation and Government Spending: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 006713, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    9. Pettersson Lidbom, Per, 2003. "Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Research Papers in Economics, Stockholm University, Department of Economics 2003:18, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    10. Florian Ade & Ronny Freier, 2011. "When Can We Trust Population Thresholds in Regression Discontinuity Designs?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1136, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Feld, Lars P., 2009. "Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 35-47, February.
    12. Patricia Funk & Christina Gathmann, 2010. "How do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from State and Local Governments, 1890 to 2005," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 2958, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Kessler, Anke, 2010. "Communication in Federal Politics: Universalism, Policy Uniformity, and the Optimal Allocation of Fiscal Authority," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7910, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:54:y:2001:i:n._1:p:57-82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charmaine Wright).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.