This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Dynamics of Political Compromise

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Avinash Dixit
Gene M. Grossman
Faruk Gul

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPEv108p531PDF
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: A link to the University of Chicago Press online edition may require you to be a subscriber to this journal to access the full text, unless the article is not yet subject to access control.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 108 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 531-568
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:108:y:2000:i:3:p:531-568

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/home.html

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislature Size, Bicameralism and Government Spending:Evidence from Democratic Countries," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/08, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," NBER Working Papers 11014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Fuchs, William & Lippi, Francesco, 2003. "Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4122, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. George Economides & Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Ulrich Woitek, 2003. "Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policies and Growth: Theory and Evidence from Germany, the UK and the US," Working Papers 2003_16, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  6. Herschel I. Grossman, 2003. ". . . and six hundred thousand men were dead," NBER Working Papers 9793, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition," Wallis Working Papers WP41, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislatures and government spending: evidence from democratic countries," ICER Working Papers 20-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. George Economides & Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Ulrich Woitek, 2003. "Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policies & Growth: Theory and Evidence from Germany, the UK and the US," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Do candidates serve parties interests? Party Polarization as a discipline device," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/13, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
  12. Milanovic, Branko & Hoff, Karla & Horowitz, Shale, 2008. "Transition from Communism: Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence," MPRA Paper 9642, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," CEPR Discussion Papers 5075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Ulrich Woitek, 2005. "Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2006. "Political reputations and campaign promises," Working Papers 1258, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Herschel Grossman, 2003. "Distributional Disputes and Civil Conflict," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 608-616. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Daron Acemoglu & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000886, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.