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Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics James M. Snyder
Michael M. Ting
Stephen Ansolabehere
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review .
Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 981-1004
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