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Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures

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Author Info
Daniel Diermeier
Roger B. Myerson

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Abstract

Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries. To analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures, we adopt a vote-buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers. We show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules, while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 89 (1999)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1182-1196
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:5:p:1182-1196

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  2. McKelvey, Richard D. & Riezman, Raymond., 1990. "Seniority in Legislatures," Working Papers 725, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gilligan, Thomas W. & Krehbiel, Keith., 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rational for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Working Papers 632, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislature Size, Bicameralism and Government Spending:Evidence from Democratic Countries," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/08, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2005. "A Theory of Bicameralism," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/04, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mattias Polborn, 2000. "Endogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 200012, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  7. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," IDEI Working Papers 492, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December. [Downloadable!]
  9. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2009. "Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislatures and government spending: evidence from democratic countries," ICER Working Papers 20-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Antonio Merlo & Daniel Diermeier & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  13. James M. Snyder & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September. [Downloadable!]
  14. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  15. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  16. Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees," Discussion Papers 2009-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  17. Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto F & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 039, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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