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Citations for "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures"

by Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier

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1. Le Breton, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying," IDEI Working Papers 714, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   
   • Michel Le Breton & Peter Sudhölter & Vera Zaporozhets, 2012. "Sequential legislative lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 491-520, July.
   • Le Breton, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying," TSE Working Papers 12-299, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   • Le Breton, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2009. "Sequential legislative lobbying," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 8/2009, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
2. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," IDEI Working Papers 716, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   
   • Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
   • Michel Le Breton & Maria Montero & Vera Zaporozhets, 2011. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," Discussion Papers 2011-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
   • Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," TSE Working Papers 12-301, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   • Michel Le Breton & Maria Montero & Vera Zaporozhets, 2011. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," Discussion Papers 2011-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
3. Antonio Merlo & Daniel Diermeier & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
4. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislature Size, Bicameralism and Government Spending:Evidence from Democratic Countries," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/08, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2004.
5. Aidt, T.S. & Giovannoni,F., 2005. "Critical Decisions and Constitutional Rules," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0523, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
   
   • Toke Aidt & Francesco Giovannoni, 2011. "Critical decisions and constitutional rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 219-268, July.
6. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2005. "A Theory of Bicameralism," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/04, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005.
7. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2008. "The Option to Wait in Collective Decisions," Working Papers 338, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   
   • Mattias K. Polborn & Matthias Messner, 2008. "The option to wait in collective decisions," 2008 Meeting Papers 397, Society for Economic Dynamics.
8. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611, May.
   
   • Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto & Trebbi, Francesco, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," Scholarly Articles 4481498, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Albero Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1957, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto F & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," NBER Working Papers 9006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Aghion, P. & Alesina, A. & Trebbi, F., 2004. "Endogenous political institutions," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
9. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
10. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
11. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
    
    • Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
12. Topi Miettinen & Panu Poutvaara, 2012. "A Market for Connections," CESifo Working Paper Series 3810, CESifo Group Munich.
13. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
14. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Voting on Devolution in a Federal Country with a Bicameral National System," Working Papers Series wp2007_09, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Economia e Dell'Impresa.
    
    • Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2012. "Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-72, March.
15. Mattias Polborn, 2000. "Endogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 200012, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
16. MichelLe Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2010. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 281-312, 03.
    
    • Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2010. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
    • Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty," IDEI Working Papers 492, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
17. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007.
18. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
19. Paulo Barelli & Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2012. "Competition For A Majority," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000445, David K. Levine.
    
    • Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2012. "Competition for a Majority," Research Papers 2104, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
20. Ragnar Torvik & Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Paper Series 13913, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    
    • Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000287, David K. Levine.
    • Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Paper Series 11711, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    • Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," NBER Working Papers 17293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Papers 0010, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
21. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December.
22. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    
    • Michel Le Berton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2007. "Legislative lobbying under political uncertainty," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0710, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
23. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1465, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    
    • Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2009. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1464, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
24. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 39, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
25. Daniel Seidmann, 2011. "A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 49-74, January.
26. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2009. "Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2659, CESifo Group Munich.
27. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "Federalism with Bicameralism," Working Papers Series wp2013_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Economia e Dell'Impresa.
28. Maik T. Schneider, 2010. "The Larger the Better? The Role of Interest-Group Size in Legislative Lobbying," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/126, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
29. Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislatures and government spending: evidence from democratic countries," ICER Working Papers 20-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    
    • Roberto Ricciuti, 2010. "Legislatures and Government Spending: Evidence from Democratic Countries," The IUP Journal of Governance and Public Policy, IUP Publications, vol. 0(1 & 2), pages 41-58, March & J.
30. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.
31. Testa, Cecilia, 2010. "Bicameralism and corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 181-198, February.
32. Bradbury, John Charles & Crain, W. Mark, 2001. "Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 309-325, December.
33. repec:oxf:wpaper:039 is not listed on IDEAS
34. Stuart Jordan & Adam Meirowitz, 2012. "Lobbying and discretion," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 683-702, April.

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