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Information and political institutions

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  • Alan E Wiseman

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  • Alan E Wiseman, 2013. "Information and political institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 301-308, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:3:p:301-308
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813481510
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Callander, Steven, 2011. "Searching for Good Policies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 643-662, November.
    2. Hall, Richard L. & Grofman, Bernard, 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1149-1166, December.
    3. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
    4. Diermeier, Daniel, 1995. "Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 344-355, June.
    5. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    6. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2013. "Informational loss in bundled bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 338-362, July.
    7. Callander, Steven, 2008. "A Theory of Policy Expertise," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(2), pages 123-140, July.
    8. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    9. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    10. Bendor, Jonathan & Meirowitz, Adam, 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 293-310, May.
    11. Krishna, Vijay, 2001. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(2), pages 435-452, June.
    12. Massimo Morelli & Richard Van Weelden, 2013. "Ideology and information in policymaking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 412-439, July.
    13. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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