Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Aggregation of Expert Opinions

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents are "informationally small." We further show that as the number of informed agents becomes large the necessary distortion goes to zero. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. In particular, the equilibria we analyze are "conditionally" dominant strategy in a precise sense. Further, the mechanisms are immune to manipulation by small groups of agents.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15a/d1503.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1503.

as in new window
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (March 2009), 65(2): 339-371
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503

Note: CFP 1239.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Information Aggregation; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Information;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  3. RICHARD McLEAN & ANDREW POSTLEWAITE, 2004. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 809-827, 07.
  4. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  5. Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
  6. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  7. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  9. Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-92, November.
  10. Matsushima Hitoshi, 1993. "Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February.
  11. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, EconWPA.
  12. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  13. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  14. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
  15. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
  16. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  17. Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
  18. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," CARESS Working Papres 99-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  19. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2006. "Reputational cheap talk," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 155-175, 03.
  20. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
  21. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Inga Deimen & Felix Ketelaar & Mark T. Le Quement, 2013. "Consistency and Communication in Committees," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse02_2013, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  3. Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007. "Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 368-398, July.
  4. repec:reg:wpaper:426 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  7. Tilman Klumpp, 2007. "Communication in financial markets with several informed traders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 437-456, December.
  8. Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
  9. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
  10. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Glena Ames).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.