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Communicating with a Team of Experts

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  • Dezsö Szalay
  • Ramon Arean

Abstract

This paper combines theories of communication with theories of expertise and teams. Facing a team of experts, who must be given incentives to acquire information and to communicate it truthfully, how can and how should the leader communicate with the team members ? We characterize all the possibilities of using the information generated efficiently, and provide a complete welfare ranking of all equilibria. The welfare ranking is shown to depend one for one on the structure of the cost of information acquisition. We discuss applications to task assignment, and to noisy and costly communication.

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File URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/05.12.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 05.12.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:05.12

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
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Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
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Related research

Keywords: information acquisition; communication; cheap talk; multiple agents; expertise;

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References

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  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Modes of communication," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9631, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Wouter Dessein & Tano Santos, 2003. "The Demand for Coordination," NBER Working Papers 10056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," CEPR Discussion Papers 4572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
  5. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  7. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 1999. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," NBER Working Papers 7158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1411R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  10. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
  11. Bauke Visser & Otto H Swank, 2007. "On Committees of Experts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372, 02.
  12. Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
  13. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
  14. Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "On Committees of Experts," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-028/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  15. Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
  16. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
  17. Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  18. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
  19. Dezsö SZALAY, 2003. "The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  20. Gerardi, Dino & McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2009. "Aggregation of expert opinions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 339-371, March.
  21. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  22. Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
  23. Martinelli, Cesar, 2006. "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
  24. Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Flavia Roldán, 2013. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-81, March.
  2. Szalay, Dezsö, 2012. "Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 386, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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