Communicating with a Team of Experts
AbstractThis paper combines theories of communication with theories of expertise and teams. Facing a team of experts, who must be given incentives to acquire information and to communicate it truthfully, how can and how should the leader communicate with the team members ? We characterize all the possibilities of using the information generated efficiently, and provide a complete welfare ranking of all equilibria. The welfare ranking is shown to depend one for one on the structure of the cost of information acquisition. We discuss applications to task assignment, and to noisy and costly communication.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 05.12.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
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Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
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Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
More information through EDIRC
information acquisition; communication; cheap talk; multiple agents; expertise;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-ICT-2006-01-01 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-KNM-2006-01-01 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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