Picking the Winners
AbstractWe analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n>w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who are the w best contestants but may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the jurors to always choose the best contestants, whoever they are. If the equilibrium concept used by the jurors is dominant strategies, the necessary and sufficient conditions incorporate very strong informational requirements on the mechanism designer. If we relax the equilibrium concept to Nash or subgame perfect equilibria the necessary and sufficient conditions are less demanding. Moreover, these conditions are also necessary for any other equilibrium concept. Finally, we study one specific application: we propose a simple and natural mechanism for the case where each juror is biased in favor of one and only one (different) contestant.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2009-2.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
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Mechanism design; Social choice;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-06-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-06-03 (Game Theory)
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