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A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

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  • Michele Lombardi

    ()

  • Naoki Yoshihara

    ()

Abstract

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— $$s$$ -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 54 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 131-151

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:131-151

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Related research

Keywords: Nash implementation; Strategy space reduction; $$s$$ -mechanisms; C72; D71; D82;

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References

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  1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Lombardi, Michele, 2010. "Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations," MPRA Paper 27834, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Michele Lombardi, 2012. "Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 297-309, December.

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