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Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

Author

Listed:
  • Matías Núñez

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres)

  • Marcus Pivato

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Deterministic voting rules are notoriously susceptible to strategic voting. We propose a new solution to this problem for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we can design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with very high probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Matías Núñez & Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ," Working Papers hal-01340317, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01340317
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01340317
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    2. Lirong Xia, 2020. "How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?," Papers 2011.03791, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    3. Kirneva Margarita & N'u~nez Mat'ias, 2023. "Legitimacy of collective decisions: a mechanism design approach," Papers 2302.09548, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Large Elections; Truth-telling; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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