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Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information

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Author Info
Gul, Faruk
Postlewaite, Andrew

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Abstract

The authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often, there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible, individually rational, and nearly efficient. The main theorem covers both the case in which aggregate uncertainty remains when the economy is replicated and the case in which replication eliminates aggregate uncertainty. In addition, the authors demonstrate how their theorem does or does not apply to standard asymmetric information problems such as the buyer's bid double auction problem, Akerlof's lemons problem, and insurance with asymmetric information. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 60 (1992)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1273-92
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:6:p:1273-92

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  1. Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000. "Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Research Memoranda 038, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rohit Rahi, 2000. "Efficiency Properties of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1468, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Johannes Berg & Matteo Marsili & Aldo Rustichini & Riccardo Zecchina, 2001. "Statistical mechanics of asset markets with private information," Quantitative Finance Papers cond-mat/0101351, arXiv.org. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jianbo Zhang & Zhentang Zhang, 1999. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Stackelberg Markets with Incomplete Information," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  5. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Compte, Olivier, 2000. "On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0829, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  7. DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005. "Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  8. Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1999. "Strategy-proofness and Markets," Discussion Papers 1255, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. repec:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1059-1059 is not listed on IDEAS
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  10. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Tymon Tatur, 2000. "Asymptotically Optimal Market Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1315, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jan 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Matthew O. Jackson & Ilan Kremer, 2003. "Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies," Microeconomics 0303008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 011, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
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