Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
AbstractWe study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to reduce noise. Contrary to models with perfectly informed experts, because of this trade-off, full revelation of information is never possible. However, almost fully efficient information extraction can be obtained in two cases. First, there is an equilibrium in which the outcome converges to the first best benchmark with no asymmetric information as we increase the precision the experts' signals. Second, the inefficiency in communication also converges to zero as the number of experts increases, even when the residual noise in the experts' private signals is large and all the experts have significant and similar (but not necessarily identical) biases.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 4 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ronny Razin & Gilat Levy, 2004.
"Multidimentional Cheap Talk,"
2004 Meeting Papers
184, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jun, Jooyong & Yoon, Kyoung-Soo, 2012. "Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 619-623.
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
- Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Communication and bargaining in the spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 251-266, January.
- Lagunoff, Roger, 2006.
"Credible communication in dynastic government,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Game Theory and Information 0203003, EconWPA.
- Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
- Andrea Galeotti & Christian Ghiglino & Francesco Squintani, 2009. "Strategic Information Transmission in Networks," Economics Discussion Papers 668, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Randall Holcombe & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2010. "Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 37-51, July.
- Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005.
"Aggregation of Expert Opinions,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Thomas König & Bernd Luig & Stephan Marc Solomon, 2010. "Sachverständige und der Einfluss von Expertise auf Reformen: Eine räumliche Analyse der Föderalismusreform II," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(3), pages 307-323, 08.
- Jackson, Aaron L., 2010. "Policy futures markets with multiple goals," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 45-54, March.
- Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.