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Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures

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Author Info
Gilligan, Thomas W
Krehbiel, Keith
Abstract

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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 3 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Fall)
Pages: 287-335
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:287-335

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  1. Keith Krehbiel, 2004. "Legislative Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 113-128, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brian Knight, 2005. "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1639-1652, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. Morten Bennedsen & Sven Feldmann, 1998. "Persuasion Through the Purse: How Political Contributions Crowd Out Information," Working Papers 9801, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  4. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert A.J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2001. "Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-052/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  6. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2005. "Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment," Microeconomics 0504006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Robert A. J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "Producing and Manipulating Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," ICER Working Papers 04-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Klaas J. Beniers & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "On the Composition of Committees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-006/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2002. "The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending," Working papers 2002-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Disobedience and Authority," Working Papers 1109, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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