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Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction

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Author Info
Roger B. Myerson

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Abstract

This paper surveys four game-theoretic models of politics, to offer an introduction to the analysis of political institutions. The first two models focus on electoral competition, to show how successful candidates' equilibrium strategies may differ under different electoral systems. The other two models probe the consequences of legislative bargaining under different constitutional structures.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1155.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1155.

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Date of creation: Apr 1996
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1155

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Galeotti, Gianluigi & Merlo, Antonio, 1994. "Political Collusion and Corruption in a Representative Democracy," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 232-43.
  2. Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1995. "Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization," Discussion Papers 1134, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Myerson, Roger B, 1995. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 77-89, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. McKelvey, Richard D. & Riezman, Raymond., 1990. "Seniority in Legislatures," Working Papers 725, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
    Other versions:
    • Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bendor, Jonathan & Diermeier, Daniel & Ting, Michael M., 2000. "A Behavioral Model of Turnout," Research Papers 1627, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  2. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1997. "Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1196, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.

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