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Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?

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Author Info
Laruelle, Annick (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))
Widgren, Mika (Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Helsinki; CEPR)

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Abstract

It has often been claimed that the current voting process within the EU Council of Ministers is not fair. In this paper we verify this assertion by carrying out an evaluation of the distribution of power among the member states. The results show that the current distribution of votes for the qualified majority does not lead to a fair distribution of power whatever definition of the EU is considered. It can not be claimed however that the current voting process has a systematic bias in favor of certain states. We also present a simple method to derive voting weights which lead to a fair allocation of power.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper with number 1996022.

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Length: 27
Date of creation: 25 Sep 1996
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1996022

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Keywords: European Union Voting Power 1966 Conference

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Widgrén, Mika, 1994. "The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1033, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. František Turnovec, 2007. "New Measure of Voting Power," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 04-14, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Stefanie Schmid-Lübbert & Hans-Bernd Schaefer, . "The Constitution of the European Union," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1030, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  4. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Barbera, Salvador & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Working Papers 1196, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bas van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Schwager, Robert, 1999. "Democratisation versus accountability - should the European Parliament be given more powers?," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-45, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Yener Kandogan, 2003. "DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-576, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  9. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Power Indices As An Aid To Institutional Design : The Generalised Apportionment Problem," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 648, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2005. "The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4954, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Plechanovová, Bela, 2003. "The Treaty of Nice and the Distribution of Votes in the Council – Voting Power Consequences for the EU after the Oncoming Enlargement," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 7, 05. [Downloadable!]
  12. Yener Kandogan, 2005. "Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1147-1156, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation of Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 644, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Leech, D., 2001. "Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 587, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Annick Laruelle, 1999. "- On The Choice Of A Power Index," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  16. Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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