The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union
AbstractWe examine national effects on the common policies of the European Union (EU). The paper establishes a difference between national influence on voting outcomes and policies. It is assumed that policies of the EU are public goods and Holler's public good power index is applied. The method is extended to cover voting games with coalitions to reveal also the effects of cooperation on policies. We show that small countries have more influence on common policies of the EU than on voting outcomes. Coalition formation can, however, ruin this since even coalitions smaller than the blocking minority can control policy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1033.
Date of creation: Oct 1994
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Casella, Alessandra, 1996.
"Large countries, small countries and the enlargement of trade blocs,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 389-415, February.
- Casella, Alessandra, 1996. "Large Countries, Small Countries and the Enlargement of Trade Blocs," CEPR Discussion Papers 1320, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella, 1995. "Large Countries, Small Countries, and the Enlargement of Trade Blocs," NBER Working Papers 5365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Johannes Pollak, 2004. "Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0019, University of Bath, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages.
- Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998.
"Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?,"
Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March.
- Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. " Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-39, March.
- Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1996. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1996022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Krumm, Raimund & Herz, Bernhard, 1997. "Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 691-703, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.