Semivalues: power,potential and multilinear extensions
AbstractThe notions of power and potential, both defined for any semivalue, give rise to two endomorphisms of the vector space of all cooperative games on a given player set. Several properties of these linear mappings are stated and their action on unanimity games is emphasized. We also relate in both cases the multilinear extension of the image game to the multilinear extension of the original game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27620.
Date of creation: 20 Dec 2010
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Cooperative game; Semivalue; Power; Potential; Multilinear extension;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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