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Who Has the Power in the EU?

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  • Jason Barr
  • Francesco Passarelli

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of enlargement to almost double its current size. This change has strong implications for the balance of power among member states. Building on the work of Shapley (1977) and Owen (1972), we present a measure of power that is based on players' preferences and number of votes. We then apply this measure to the current and future EU states to see who wields the most power now and who is likely to wield power after enlargement. Further we show how a country's power can change based on the preferences of the agenda setter, which, in this case, is the European Commission.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark in its series Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark with number 2004-005.

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Handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2004-005

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Keywords: Power Indices; European Union; Principal Components;

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References

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  1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  2. Pradeep Dubey & Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2004. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2004-012, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
  4. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7760, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
  6. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 339-56.
  7. Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 2004. "The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View," Scholarly Articles 4553004, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
  9. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 2004. "The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2029, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
  11. Winter, Eyal, 2002. "The shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 2025-2054 Elsevier.
  12. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 2002. "Variations on the shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 54, pages 2055-2076 Elsevier.
  13. Adam Brandenburger & Harborne Stuart, 2007. "Biform Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(4), pages 537-549, April.
  14. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
  15. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151 Elsevier.
  16. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
  17. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Kornhauser, Lewis A., 2002. "Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 60, pages 2229-2269 Elsevier.
  18. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," IDEI Working Papers 716, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2004. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2004-012, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
  3. Paolo Di Giannatale, Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Voting Chances Instead of Voting Weights," ISLA Working Papers 40, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  4. Fuad Aleskerov, 2008. "Power distribution in the electoral body with an application to the Russian Parliament," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 11-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  5. Napel, Stefan & Widgren, Mika, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  6. Diego Varela & Javier Prado-Dominguez, 2012. "Negotiating the Lisbon Treaty: Redistribution, Efficiency and Power Indices," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(2), pages 107-124, July.

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