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Who Has the Power in the EU?

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Author Info
Jason Barr
Francesco Passarelli ()

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of enlargement to almost double its current size. This change has strong implications for the balance of power among member states. Building on the work of Shapley (1977) and Owen (1972), we present a measure of power that is based on players' preferences and number of votes. We then apply this measure to the current and future EU states to see who wields the most power now and who is likely to wield power after enlargement. Further we show how a country's power can change based on the preferences of the agenda setter, which, in this case, is the European Commission.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark in its series Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark with number 2004-005.

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Handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2004-005

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Related research
Keywords: Power Indices; European Union; Principal Components;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2002. "What Does the European Union Do?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 339-56.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2004. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2004-012, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
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