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Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union

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  • Borkowski, Agnieszka
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    Abstract

    Mit dem Beitritt der zehn neuen Mitgliedsstaaten zur Europäischen Union im Mai 2004 wird sich die bestehende Machtverteilung zwischen den EU-Staaten verändern. Die Erweiterung wird sich auf die Effizienz der Entscheidungsfindung auswirken und deshalb sind weitere institutionelle Reformen innerhalb der EU notwendig. Der Vertrag von Nizza, welcher dieses Problem behandelte und auf der Regierungskonferenz im Dezember 2000 in Nizza beschlossen wurde, hat die EU nicht ausreichend auf die Erweiterung vorbereitet. Der Europäische Konvent, welcher einen ersten Entwurf einer Europäischen Verfassung erarbeitet hat, empfiehlt unter anderem weiterreichende Änderungen im institutionellem Bereich, vor allem bei den Entscheidungsverfahren im Ministerrat. Die vom Konvent vorgeschlagene neue qualifizierte Mehrheit (einfache Mehrheit der Staaten und 60 Prozent der EUBevölkerung ab 2009) würde die komplizierte dreifache Mehrheit (1. 72,27 Prozent der Stimmen im Rat der EU-25, 2. einfache Mehrheit der Staaten und 3. 62 Prozent der EU-Bevölkerung) für Beschlussfassungen im Ministerrat ersetzen, welche in Nizza vereinbart wurde und am 1. Januar 2005 in Kraft treten wird. Der Konventsvorschlag würde zwar die Entscheidungsprozedur vereinfachen, aber auch die Macht im Ministerrat zugunsten der vier größten Staaten, insbesondere Deutschlands, verlagern. Für die Analyse der Machtverteilung im Ministerrat nach der Erweiterung wurden Machtindizes angewandt. Diese ermöglichen eine Messung der Abstimmungsstärke eines Spielers/ Landes in einem Gremium mit Mehrheitsentscheidungsverfahren. Qualitative Aspekte der Macht, wie z.B. Präferenzen der Staaten, werden von diesen Maßen nicht berücksichtigt. Machtindizes dienen in dieser Analyse dazu, Veränderungen in der Abstimmungsstärke der Staaten in einer erweiterten EU zu quantifizieren sowie einige der Auswirkungen der institutionellen Reformen, die in Nizza bzw. durch den Konvent beschlossen bzw. vorgeschlagen wurden, darzustellen. -- E N G L I S H V E R S I O N: With the accession of ten new member states to the EU in May 2004, the existing power distribution between the EU states will change. The enlargement will have an impact upon the efficiency of decision-making and thus requires constitutional improvements of decision procedures. The Treaty of Nice, which dealt with this problem and was agreed on in Nice in December 2000, has not satisfactorily prepared the Union for the enlargement. The European Convention, which worked out the first European Constitution, suggests, among other things, some modifications in the institutional area and decision-making within the Council of Ministers. If the proposed new qualified majority (a majority of Member States and 60 per cent of the EU population after 2009) replaces the complicated triple-qualified majority (72.27 per cent of votes in the Council representing a majority of states and 62 per cent of the EUpopulation) coming into force after January 2005, power in favour of the four biggest states (especially Germany) will be redistributed. In this analysis of power distribution in the Council of Ministers after enlargement power indices are used. This mathematical method measures the voting power of a member state in a Council with majority decision-making. It can only be used when preferences of the voters/states are not considered. Thus, power indices are very helpful for demonstrating the voting power of the member states in the Council of Ministers in the enlarged European Union and analyzing institutional reforms by the Treaty of Nice and the European Convention.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) in its series IAMO Discussion Papers with number 54.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:iamodp:14887

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    Keywords: EU; Entscheidungsverfahren; Erweiterung; Europäischer Konvent; Machtindex; EU; Decision-making process; Enlargement; European Convention; Power index;

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    1. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) 1998001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
    3. Heinemann, Friedrich, 2000. "The political economy of EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 00-43, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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    5. Madeleine Hösli, 1994. "Der potentielle Einfluss der Schweiz im EG-Ministerrat: Eine Analyse aufgrund des Banzhaf-Machtindexes," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 130(I), pages 89-105, March.
    6. R J Johnston, 1978. "On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
    7. Widgren, Mika, 1991. "Voting Power in the EC Decision Making and the Consequencesof two Different Enlargements," Discussion Papers, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy 377, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    8. Wolfgang Wessels, 2001. "Nice Results: The Millennium IGC in the EU's Evolution," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 197-219, 06.
    9. Garrett, Geoffrey & Tsebelis, George, 1996. "An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 269-299, March.
    10. Rapoport, Amnon & Cohen, Ariel, 1986. "Paradoxes of quarreling in weighted majority games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 235-250.
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