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Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Napel

    (University of Hamburg, napel@econ.uni-hamburg.de)

  • Mika Widgren

    (Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, mika.widgren@tukku.fi)

Abstract

This paper proposes a unified framework that integrates the traditional index-based approach and the competing non-cooperative approach to power analysis. It rests on a quantifiable notion of ex post power as the (counter-factual) sensitivity of the expected or observed outcome to individual players. Thus, it formalizes players’ marginal impact on outcomes in both cooperative and non-cooperative games, for both strategic interaction as well as purely random behavior. By taking expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures, one obtains meaningful measures of ex ante power. Established power indices turn out to be special cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 517-538, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:16:y:2004:i:4:p:517-538
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629804046152
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    References listed on IDEAS

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