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The Impact of Council's Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU

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Author Info
Mika Widgrén () (Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics)

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Abstract

This paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 26.

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Length: 27
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp26

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Related research
Keywords: European integration; Council of Ministers; power;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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  1. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2004. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2004-012, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Working Papers 345, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Widgren, Mika, 1995. " Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(2), pages 345-56, June.
  9. Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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