The Impact of Council's Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU
AbstractThis paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 26.
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
European integration; Council of Ministers; power;
Other versions of this item:
- Mika Widgrén, 2008. "The Impact of Council’s Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 2195, CESifo Group Munich.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-01-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-17 (Game Theory)
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