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DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries

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Author Info
Yener Kandogan ()
Abstract

I carry out a power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty of the EU on the widening and deepening of European integration, by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decrease in voting power of small countries makes widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increase in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increase in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more in the coalitions they form, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist face for the EU in the way votes are distributed in Nice.

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Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 2003-576.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-576

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Related research
Keywords: EU; Voting Power; Integration; Enlargement; Federalis;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1997. "The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament," CEPR Discussion Papers 1600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 317-339, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Hosli, Madeleine O, 1993. "Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 47(4), pages 629-43, Autumn.
  4. Richard E. Baldwin & Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, 1997. "The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 125-176, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kandogan, Yener, 2000. "Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 685-705, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hosli, Madeleine O., 1993. "Admission of European Free Trade Association states to the European Community: effects on voting power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(04), pages 629-643, September. [Downloadable!]
  9. Leech, Dennis, 2002. " Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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