Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures
AbstractProbabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to access actors‚ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. By a subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for instance, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 1998001.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 2000. "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 17, pages 67-84.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 54, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
- Widgrén, Mika, 2001. "Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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