The Power of a Spatially Inferior Player
AbstractTraditional power indices are not suited to take account of explicit preferences, strategic interaction, and particular decision procedures. This paper studies a new way to measure decision power, based on fully specified spatial preferences and strategic interaction in an explicit voting game with agenda setting. We extend the notion of inferior players to this context, and introduce a power index which - like the traditional ones - defines powers as the ability to have pivotal influence on outcomes, not as the (often just lucky) occurrence of outcomes close to a player's ideal policy. Though, at the present state, formal analysis is based on restrictive assumptions, our general approach opens an avenue for a new type of power measurement
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy in its series Discussion Papers with number 771.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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- Mika Widgrén & Stefan Napel, 2001.
"Inferior players in simple games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 209-220.
- Powers, Joseph E., 2004. "Strategic Interaction in United States Fishery Management Councils," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 19(4).
- Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "The Hoede-Bakker index modiﬁed to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00406430, HAL.
- Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Working Papers 345, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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