The political economy of EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice
AbstractThe paper applies standard public choice reasoning to the negotiations on EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice. The starting point is the assumption that accession can only be successfully completed if the interests of decisive actors in present EU countries are respected. Decisive actors in the West are the members of the European Parliament, individuals in national governments and in the Commission. Personal costs and benefits of these individuals are analysed with respect to enlargement. Furthermore, the basic strategic issues of the negotiations are depicted that arise from the different pre-entry and post-entry position of new members. The Intergovernmental Conference is reinterpreted as an opportunity of EU-15 actors to protect their personal interests in an enlarged Community. The relative attractiveness of the 13 official candidate countries is assessed on the basis of some indicators that emerge as important from the political-economic approach. The paper concludes by giving some cautious forecasts about likely outcomes of both the Treaty of Nice and the accession bargaining. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 00-43.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
EU-Enlargement; Intergovernmental Conference 2000; Treaty of Nice; political economy;
Other versions of this item:
- Heinemann, Friedrich, 2003. "The political economy of EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 17-31, March.
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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