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The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community

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Author Info
 Vaubel, Roland
Abstract

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. 'Popitz's law' of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 81 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Pages: 151-90
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:81:y:1994:i:1-2:p:151-90

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  1. Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, 2007. "Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 275-295, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Beat Spirig & Rolf Weder, 2008. "To Wait or Not to Wait: Swiss EU-Membership as an Investment under Uncertainty," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(I), pages 85-114, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2003. "Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Andreas Kyriacou, 2009. "Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 143-158, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Karol Boudreaux & Jody Lipford, 1998. "Group Size, Group Heterogeneity, and Voting Rules: An Application of the Buchanan-Tullock Model to the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 133-152, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Milanovic, Branko, 1996. "Nations, conglomerates, and empires : the tradeoff between income and sovereignty," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1675, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Vaubel, Roland, 2003. "Principal-Agent-Probleme in Internationalen Organisationen," Discussion Paper Series 26392, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Accounting for centralisation in the European Union : Niskanen, Monnet or Thatcher?," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-05, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  10. Dennis Mueller, 2005. "Constitutional political economy in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 57-73, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach & Christoph A Schaltegger, 2004. "On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200419, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
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  12. Bruno S. Frey, . "A Utopia? Government Without Territorial Monopoly," IEW - Working Papers iewwp047, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Ralph Rotte & Klaus Zimmermann, 1998. "Fiscal restraint and the political economy of EMU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 385-406, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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