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Determinants of government size: Evidence from China

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  • Wu, Alfred M.
  • Lin, Mi

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of government size at the provincial level in China. We employ the panel data model as a platform for empirical analysis and control for endogeneity in the study. Our study shows that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may curtail government expansion, and that the provincial-level public sector is characterized by economies of scale. This study also documents that Wagner’s law does not hold true for China. Moreover, both expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization contribute to the expansion of China’s government.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27089.

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Date of creation: 23 Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27089

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Keywords: Government size - Wagner’s law - Scale effects - Openness to trade - Fiscal decentralization;

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References

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  1. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Ming-Hung Yao, 2009. "Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0903, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  2. De Witte, Kristof & Moesen, Wim, 2009. "Sizing the Government," MPRA Paper 14785, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Ferris, J.S. & Park, S. & Winer, S.L., 2007. "Studying the Role of Political Competition in the Evolution of Government Size Over Long Horizons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0774, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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  7. Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto, 1998. "Openness, Country Size and Government," Scholarly Articles 4553014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Akitoby, Bernardin & Clements, Benedict & Gupta, Sanjeev & Inchauste, Gabriela, 2006. "Public spending, voracity, and Wagner's law in developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 908-924, December.
  9. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, November.
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  13. Jin, Jing & Zou, Heng-fu, 2002. "How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 270-293, September.
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  15. Ernesto Stein, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 357-391, November.
  16. Emmanuel Ziramba, 2008. "Wagner'S Law: An Econometric Test For South Africa, 1960-2006," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 76(4), pages 596-606, December.
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  19. Ram, Rati, 2009. "Openness, country size, and government size: Additional evidence from a large cross-country panel," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 213-218, February.
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  21. Tobin, Damian, 2005. "Economic Liberalization, the Changing Role of the State and "Wagner's Law": China's Development Experience since 1978," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 729-743, May.
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  23. Sinha, Dipendra, 2007. "Does the Wagner’s Law hold for Thailand? A Time Series Study," MPRA Paper 2560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Chien-Hsun Chen, 2004. "Fiscal decentralization, collusion and government size in China's transitional economy," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(11), pages 699-705.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wu, Alfred M. & Wang, Wen, 2013. "Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 176-184.
  2. Jia, Junxue & Guo, Qingwang & Zhang, Jing, 2014. "Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 107-122.
  3. Wang, Zhiguo & Ma, Liang, 2012. "New Development of Fiscal Decentralization in China," MPRA Paper 36918, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Zhiguo Wang & Liang Ma, 2014. "Fiscal Decentralization in China: A Literature Review," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 51-65, May.
  5. Brehm, Stefan, 2013. "Fiscal Incentives, Public Spending, and Productivity – County-Level Evidence from a Chinese Province," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 92-103.

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