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Peltzman on regulation and politics

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  • Victor Goldberg
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    Abstract

    There is no question that self-interest matters, not only in private markets but in the political arena as well (see Goldberg, 1974, 1976, 1977). Peltzman's paper is an extremely clever effort to pose the political problem so that the tools and reasoning from the standard model could be extended to the new area with minimal modification. The approach directs attention to technical questions — e.g., the signs of second derivatives (Peltzman, 1976: 220–221) — of a familiar sort. However, the environment in the new area is so different from the more mundane environments in which the theory normally thrives that a major adaptive effort will be necessary for the theory to survive. If it does survive, it will be in a form that is almost unrecognizable. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00162121
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 39 (1982)
    Issue (Month): 2 (January)
    Pages: 291-297

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:2:p:291-297

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1975. "The Transitional Gains Trap," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 671-678, Autumn.
    2. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
    3. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
    4. John Chant & Keith Acheson, 1972. "The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 13-33, March.
    5. Goldberg, Victor P, 1974. "Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 461-92, October.
    6. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    7. North, Douglass C, 1978. "Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 963-78, September.
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    Cited by:
    1. Vaubel, Roland, 2003. "Principal-Agent-Probleme in internationalen Organisationen," HWWA Discussion Papers 219, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    2. Walter Primeaux & John Filer & Robert Herren & Daniel Hollas, 1984. "Determinants of regulatory policies toward competition in the electric utility industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 173-186, January.
    3. Economides, Nicholas & Hubbard, R Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 667-704, October.

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