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The Transitional Gains Trap

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Author Info
Gordon Tullock
Abstract

Many government programs which appear to be designed to help some particular industry or group do not seem to be succeeding. The explanation offered here is that the program, when inaugurated, generated transitional gains for the individuals or companies in the industry, but that these have been fully capitalized, with the result that the people in the industry now are doing no better than normal. On the other hand, the termination of the particular scheme would, in general, lead to large losses for the entrenched interests.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (1975)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 671-678
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:6:y:1975:i:autumn:p:671-678

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  3. Golan, Elise & Kuchler, Fred & Mitchell, Lorraine, 2000. "Economics Of Food Labeling," Agricultural Economics Reports 34069, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. [Downloadable!]
  4. Blair Jenkins, 2009. "Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis - With Some Help From Moody and Marvell," Econ Journal Watch, Atlas Economic Research Foundation, vol. 6(1), pages 73-112, January. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, 2006. "The Church vs the Mall: What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition?," NBER Working Papers 12410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Bonardi, Jean-Philippe, 2008. "The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities," MPRA Paper 14500, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Anthony Evans, 2009. "Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 118-138, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kosfeld, M., 1999. "Why shops close again : an evolutionary perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours," Research Memorandum 776, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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