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The Transitional Gains Trap

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  • Gordon Tullock
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    Abstract

    Many government programs which appear to be designed to help some particular industry or group do not seem to be succeeding. The explanation offered here is that the program, when inaugurated, generated transitional gains for the individuals or companies in the industry, but that these have been fully capitalized, with the result that the people in the industry now are doing no better than normal. On the other hand, the termination of the particular scheme would, in general, lead to large losses for the entrenched interests.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 6 (1975)
    Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
    Pages: 671-678

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    Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:6:y:1975:i:autumn:p:671-678

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    Cited by:
    1. Richard Sansing & Peter M. Vandoren, 1994. "Escaping the transitional gains trap," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(3), pages 565-570.
    2. Frank Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, 2000. "The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 295-318, December.
    3. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . "Policy Persistence," CARESS Working Papres 97-2, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    4. Cairns, Robert D., 1992. "La recherche de rentes en situation d’incertitude avec ou sans opposition," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 477-498, septembre.
    5. Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, 2006. "The Church vs the Mall: What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition?," NBER Working Papers 12410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Gorecki, Paul K., 2009. "The Recession, Budgets, Competition, and Regulation: Should the State Supply Bespoke Protection?," Papers BP2010/2, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    7. Bonardi, Jean-Philippe, 2008. "The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities," MPRA Paper 14500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. William Mitchell, 1989. "Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 283-292, December.
    9. John Moorhouse, 1984. "Is Tullock correct about Sunday closing laws?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 197-203, January.
    10. Golan, Elise H. & Kuchler, Fred & Mitchell, Lorraine, 2000. "Economics Of Food Labeling," Agricultural Economics Reports 34069, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    11. Randall Holcombe & Christopher Boudreaux, 2013. "Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 409-421, September.
    12. Michael Marlow & William Orzechowski, 1988. "Controlling leviathan through tax reduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 237-245, September.
    13. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    14. repec:esr:chaptr:jacb200962 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Charles Rowley, 2012. "The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 29-46, July.
    16. Victor Goldberg, 1982. "Peltzman on regulation and politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 291-297, January.

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