Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (1974)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
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- P. HÃ¤gg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
- Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242.
- Peter Van Wijck & Jules Theeuwes, 2000. "Protection against Unfair Contracts: An Economic Analysis of European Regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 75-91, January.
- Oren Gazal-Ayal, 2007. "Economic analysis of standard form contracts: the monopoly case," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 119-136, October.
- Giulio Palermo, 2005. "Misconceptions of Power: From Alchian and Demsetz to Bowles and Gintis," Working Papers ubs0510, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
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