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Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking

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Author Info

  • Elie Appelbaum
  • Eliakim Katz

Abstract

We would like to thank Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00179730
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 48 (1986)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Pages: 175-181

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:48:y:1986:i:2:p:175-181

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Plourde, Charles & Yeung, David, 1989. "A model of industrial pollution in a stochastic environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 97-105, March.
  2. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series 646, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Cairns, Robert D., 1992. "La recherche de rentes en situation d’incertitude avec ou sans opposition," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 477-498, septembre.
  4. Fabella, Raul V., 1989. "Uncertain monopoly rent and the social cost of rent seeking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 199-203.
  5. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008. "Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 133-150, March.
  6. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
  7. Jörg Franke & Tahir Öztürk, 2009. "Conflict Networks," Ruhr Economic Papers 0116, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  8. Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602.
  9. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-99, September.
  10. Gordon Tullock, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 95-97, January.
  11. J. Smith & Shlomo Weber, 1989. "Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 153-166, May.
  12. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March.
  13. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986. "Rent seeking and entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 207-212.
  14. Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996. "On the Win Probability in Rent-Seeking Gemes," Memorandum 05/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  15. Cairns, Robert D. & Van Long, Ngo, 1991. "Rent seeking with uncertain opposition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1223-1235, August.
  16. Rajeev Goel & Daniel Rich, 1989. "On the economic incentives for taking bribes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 269-275, June.
  17. Roe, Terry L. & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1990. "Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium," Bulletins 7483, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
  18. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
  19. Richard Allard, 1988. "Rent-seeking with non-identical players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 3-14, April.
  20. Cairns, Robert D & Long, Ngo Van, 1998. "On Opposition to Rent Seeking: Implications for Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 282-92, October.
  21. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
  22. Mohtadi, Hamid, 1992. "Environment, trade, and strategic interdependence: A simple model with implications for NAFTA," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 175-186.
  23. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-87, December.
  24. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
  25. Eliakim Katz & J. Smith, 1988. "Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 25-36, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Cairns, Robert D., 1992. "La recherche de rentes en situation d’incertitude avec ou sans opposition," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 477-498, septembre.
  3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  4. Roe, Terry L. & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1990. "Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium," Bulletins 7483, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
  5. Rajeev Goel & Daniel Rich, 1989. "On the economic incentives for taking bribes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 269-275, June.
  6. Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "Conflict and Rent-Seeking: Ratio Vs. Difference Models," UCLA Economics Working Papers 491, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. J. Smith & Shlomo Weber, 1989. "Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 153-166, May.
  8. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/111, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  9. Chambers, Robert G. & Tzouvelekas, Vangelis, 2013. "Estimating population dynamics without population data," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 510-522.
  10. Coggins, Jay S. & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore & Roe, Terry L., 1988. "Existence of Equilibria in Lobbying Economics," Bulletins 7468, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
  11. Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. " Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
  12. José Casas–Pardo & Juan Montoro–Pons, 2001. "On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-253, September.
  13. Mahmudul Anam & Eliakim Katz, 1988. "Rent-seeking and second best economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 215-224, December.
  14. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
  15. Jörg Franke & Tahir Öztürk, 2009. "Conflict Networks," Ruhr Economic Papers 0116, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  16. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.

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