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Optimal Rent-Seeking Group

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  • Sanghack Lee

Abstract

This note characterizes rent-seeking competition under the possibility of cooperation between rent seekers. Rational individuals are shown either to form a group to fight for the rent or not, depending upon costs and benefits of group formation. In the normative respect, group formation by rent seekers turns out to reduce social wastes resulting from rent-seeking competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanghack Lee, 1992. "Optimal Rent-Seeking Group," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 36(2), pages 58-60, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:36:y:1992:i:2:p:58-60
    DOI: 10.1177/056943459203600207
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    2. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    3. Brooks, Michael A & Heijdra, Ben J, 1989. "An Exploration of Rent Seeking," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(188), pages 32-50, March.
    4. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
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    1. repec:elg:eechap:15325_6 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
    3. Euan Fleming, 1998. "Rent-seeking in rural development projects: its potential causes and measures to reduce its costs," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 277-299.

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