An Exploration of Rent Seeking
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to critically survey the recent literature on rent seeking and directly unproductive profit-seeking activities. The links with the related literatures on transactions costs and property rights are also explored. It is argued that a clearer understanding of wasteful competition emerges if the framework of constitutional economics is adopted. It is furthermore argued that a dynamic framework is most suitable to analyze wasteful competition. Copyright 1989 by The Economic Society of Australia.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The Economic Society of Australia in its journal The Economic Record.
Volume (Year): 65 (1989)
Issue (Month): 188 (March)
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- Sherrill Shaffer & Jason F. Shogren, 2008.
"Related Contests: A General Parameterization,"
CAMA Working Papers
2008-27, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Rauscher, Michael, 2001. "International Trade, Foreign Investment, and the Enivronment," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 29, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
- Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
- José Casas–Pardo & Juan Montoro–Pons, 2001. "On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-253, September.
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