Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer
AbstractLaboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent-defending activity on rent-seeking auction outcomes. In part, Nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide: as predicted, more rents are dissipated in perfectly-discriminating auctions, where the high-bidder wins, than in lotteries, where relative bids determine the chance of winning. Also as predicted, the introduction of a rent-defending buyer reduces social costs. Nevertheless, the social costs of rent-seeking consistently exceed predicted levels. Moreover, individual bidding, especially by buyers, deviates markedly from Nash predictions. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 95 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998. "Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
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