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On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

Gordon Tullock’s “Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft” is by now widely regarded to be a classic work in public choice. However, like many “classic papers,” it was not always so highly regarded. It was rejected at several journals before finding its way to print and arguably took two or three decades to be fully appreciated. This paper discusses developments in the public choice and rent seeking literatures that helped bring Tullock’s paper to its status as a classic work in political economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 2019. "On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 5-12, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:181:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0542-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0542-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski, 2020. "The foundations of contemporary economics: Gordon Tullock and public choice," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 107-118.
    2. Randall G. Holcombe, 2023. "The transformative impact of rent-seeking theory on the study of public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 157-167, July.
    3. Chao Hu & Jianping Tao & Donghao Zhang & Damian Adams, 2021. "Price Signal of Tilled Land in Rural China: An Empirically Oriented Transaction Costs Study Based on Contract Theory," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-20, August.

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