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Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities

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Author Info
Glazer, A.
Konrad, K.A.

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Abstract

We consider taxes on firms which engage in rent-seeking contests. The taxes can be on realized profits or on rent-seeking expenditures, and the firms can engage in a context where either the hoghest bidder wins the prize, or else a firm's probability of winning equals the ratio of its expenditures to expenditures by all firms. We find the deadweight loss, and cause no reduction in the profits of firms.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 97-98-04.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:97-98-04

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: TAXES ; ENTERPRISES;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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