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Benefits to the majority from universal service

Author

Listed:
  • Amihai Glazer

    (University of California, Irvine)

  • Stef Proost

    (KU Leuven)

Abstract

Rent seekers may attempt to limit costly rent seeking. One way is to increase the number of projects, even to universal service. In particular, a legislator may propose a number of projects that exceeds the number of members in the majority (as by too many bus stops, or too many university campuses), thereby inducing each member of the majority to reduce his rent-seeking efforts. This mechanism can also induce the majority to favor low quality of the projects, and to favor having the central government impose co-funding requirements on local governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2020. "Benefits to the majority from universal service," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 391-408, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:27:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10797-019-09560-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-019-09560-x
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent seeking; Federalism; Universal service; Public agencies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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