Committees and rent-seeking effort
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 25 (1984)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
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