Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly
AbstractIf each legislator wishes to encourage other legislators to address new problems in future periods, then a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can exist with the following properties: (1) no legislator finds it worthwhile to make a narrow proposal that appeals to a minimum majority; (2) instead, legislators propose policies that appeal to all members, not for fear of retaliation but rather to encourage other members to work on new problems in succeeding periods; and (3) in succeeding periods, no legislator amends the existing broad policy. The authors find an equilibrium with these properties in finite as well as infinite period games. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 74 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003.
"Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," ICER Working Papers 04-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2010.
"Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service,"
101106, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Amihai GLAZER & Stef PROOST, 2010. "Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces10.31, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Ashish Chaturvedi & Amihai Glazer, 2005. "Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies," Working Papers 050614, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2010. "Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies," Working Papers 2072/151549, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012.
"How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose,"
Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS
2012-11-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Working Papers 111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2013. "A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting," Discussion Papers 2013-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.