Intrinsic Motivation and Incentives
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
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- Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2009.
"Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance,"
NBER Working Papers
14906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2008. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 3411, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Frederico Finan & Claudio Ferraz, 2009. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," Working Papers id:1889, eSocialSciences.
- F. Barigozzi & N. Burani, 2013. "Intrinsic Motivation in the Labor Market: Not Too Much, Thank You," Working Papers wp866, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Boyer, 2013. "Welfare programs and motivation bias of social workers," 2013 Meeting Papers 617, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Liu, Taoxiong & Zhou, Bihua, 2011. "Commitment and optimal incentive," MPRA Paper 35550, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Dec 2011.
- Lea Cassar, 2014. "Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission," ECON - Working Papers 150, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Walter Buhr, 2009. "Infrastructure of the Market Economy," Volkswirtschaftliche DiskussionsbeitrÃ¤ge 132-09, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
- Benno Torgler & Bruno S. Frey & Markus Schaffner & Sascha L. Schmidt, 2008.
"A Crowding-out Effect for Relative Income,"
CREMA Working Paper Series
2008-20, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Benno Torgler & Bruno S.Frey & Markus Schaffner & Sascha L.Schmidt, 2008. "A Crowding-Out Effect for Relative Income," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 236, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- Alexandros Karakostas & Axel Sonntag & Daniel John Zizzo, 2013. "Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Sharon Belenzon & Mark Schankerman, 2008. "Motivation and sorting in open source software innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51594, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Onishi, Koichiro, 2013. "The effects of compensation plans for employee inventions on R&D productivity: New evidence from Japanese panel data," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 367-378.
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