Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence
AbstractThis paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party élites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the saliency of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from US states, we find evidence in favour of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2381.
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
- Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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