Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview
In: Studies in Public Regulation
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- Joskow, Paul L. & Noll, Roger G., . "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," Working Papers 213, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- P. L. Joskow & R. G. Noll, 1978. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," Working papers 218, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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