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Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview

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  • Joskow, Paul L.
  • Noll, Roger G.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 213.

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Publication status: Published in Studies in Public Regulation, edited by Gary Fromm. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:213

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
Phone: 626 395-4065
Fax: 626 405-9841
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Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Cited by:
  1. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
  2. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
  3. Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1029-1073, 06.
  4. Mathew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, 1984. "Constituency influences on legislative policy choice," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 299-319, August.
  5. Faye Steiner, 2004. "The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 59-80, January.
  6. Doucet, J. & Littlechild, S., 2006. "Negotiated Settlements: The development of economic and legal thinking," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0622, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  7. Siebert, Horst, 1981. "Die Neuorientierung der amerikanischen Energiepolitik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 3573, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  8. Brigitte Unger & Franz Traxler, 1990. "Institutionelle Erfolgsbedingungen wirtschaftlichen Strukturwandels. Zum Verhältnis von Effizienz und Regulierung aus theoretischer und empirischer Sicht," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 16(2), pages 189-224.
  9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  10. Evans, Lewis & Hahn, Robert W., 2010. "Regulating Dynamic Markets: Progress in Theory and Practice," Working paper 606, Regulation2point0.
  11. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
  12. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2013. "Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach," MPRA Paper 47139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," CRSP working papers 492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  14. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Katrin Sobania, 2000. "Von Regulierungen zu Deregulierungen - Eine Analyse aus institutionenökonomischer Sicht -," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 37, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  16. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1998. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," NBER Working Papers 6637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Palmer, Karen & Ando, Amy, 1998. "Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring," Discussion Papers dp-98-19-rev, Resources For the Future.
  18. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.

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