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A political economy model of immigration quotas

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  • J. Amegashie

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Abstract

The paper examines a model in which the number of immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying contest between a firm and a union. The union and the firm bargain over the wage of natives after the number of immigrants that will be permitted is known. I assume that the lobbying contest is an all-pay auction (i.e., the lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty). Comparative statics results are derived to show how the reservation wage of immigrants, the price of the firm’s product, the size of the union and the cost of lobbying affect immigration quotas and the post-immigration wage of natives. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 5 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 255-267

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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:255-267

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Related research

Keywords: All-pay auction; contests; immigration quotas; lobbying;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Prachi Mishra & Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda, 2008. "Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?," IMF Working Papers 08/244, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Gil Epstein, 2006. "The political economy of population economics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 255-257, June.
  3. Tapio Palokangas, 2008. "Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 007-020, March.
  4. Russo, Giuseppe, 2008. "Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion," MPRA Paper 6845, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Epstein, Gil S. & Heizler (Cohen), Odelia, 2007. "Illegal Migration, Enforcement and Minimum Wage," IZA Discussion Papers 2830, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2005. "The Struggle over Migration Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 1533, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Bertrand CRETTEZ, 2011. "Is Selling Immigration Rights Politically Sustainable ?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2011042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  9. Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giorgio Bellettini, 2004. "Unions and the political economy of immigration," 2004 Meeting Papers 494, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Simon Guidecoq & Michel Rocca, 2010. "Réforme "Obama" de la politique d'immigration et pronostics des théories économiques : les influences de la majorité politique et de la conjoncture économique," Post-Print halshs-00560088, HAL.
  11. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1421, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.
  13. G. Bellettini & C. Berti Ceroni, 2004. "A positive analysis of immigration policy," Working Papers 520, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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